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Abstract 
There is a broad consensus among social and economic researchers that ‘institutions’ matter. Institutions 
influence beliefs, norms and actions; thus they shape performance and outcomes. Interestingly, the concept 
of institutions is not well established in construction economics or management research, specifically in 
waste-related literature. This paper presents discussions on the impact of imperfect regulations, norms and 
cultural/cognitive assumptions that exist within the construction procurement context, and how this has 
translated into the institutionalisation of wasteful behaviours and practices in construction projects. Based 
on a critical review of extant literature, the ultimate objectives of this study are to: (1) contribute to the 
overall understanding of waste in construction by suggesting a novel perspective to the generation and 
persistence of waste in construction projects; (2) demonstrate how the neo-institutional theory, a branch of 
organizational sociology, can potentially be applied as an analytical lens to deliver a more explicit theory 
of waste that relates cause and effect within the wider aspects of construction procurement systems and 
relationships; (3) highlight a number of widely accepted regulations, norms and meanings that impede 
efficiency and improvement efforts in construction; and (4) formulate propositions on institutional waste in 
the process of construction procurement that will be fundamental to the future trajectory of this study. 
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Introduction 
It is widely accepted that there is considerable 
waste in the end-to-end design, construction and 
facility management process. Over the past sixty 
years the industry has commissioned several 
reports with the aim of reviewing its performance 
and suggesting means of improvement. Of these, 
the Egan report, ‘Rethinking Construction’, was 
produced in 1998 to address concerns raised by 
clients engaging services of construction 
companies; and was followed by the ‘Never Waste 
A Good Crisis’ report published by construction 
excellence in 2009 to review the subsequent 
progress. The former report sent a clear message to 
the construction industry by stressing that: 
 
“Recent studies in the USA, 
Scandinavia and this country suggest 
that up to 30% of construction is 
rework, labor is used at only 40-60% of 
potential efficiency, accidents can 
account for 3-6% of total project costs, 
and at least 10% of materials are 
wasted…The message is clear - there is 
plenty of scope for improving efficiency 
and quality simply by taking waste out 
of construction” (Egan, 1998, p.15). 
 
Empirical evidence points to waste in excess of 
50% of construction time (Figure 1), where waste 
is defined as anything that is not required to create 
value for the customer/client or end-user. This is 
primarily process waste with some physical waste. 
The fact that much of this waste is common to 
many projects suggests that there are imperfect 
systems and structural arrangements that support 
and/or encourage wasteful activities. To say that 
waste is created due to human error is unhelpful; 
blame arguably fails to facilitate learning to ‘do 
better’ and similarly fails to lead us towards 
effective methods of reduction or prevention. As 
Dr Deming taught us: ‘94% of troubles and failures 
are attributed to the system (responsibility of 
management), 6% are due to special cases (such as 
human mistake)’ (Deming, 1984, p. 315). Human 
behaviour is always influenced by the environment 
in which it takes place (i.e. broader organisational 
system or institutional environment). Without a 
deep understanding of the economic, social and 
environmental issues contributing to poor decision-
making, it is very likely that similar flawed or risky 
decisions will recur. For this reason, Levensen 
(2011) emphasises that: ‘Without changing the 
environment, human error cannot be reduced for 
long. We design systems in which human error is 
inevitable and then blame the human and not the 
system design' (p. 61). 
The UK Government has recently created a set of 
challenging construction targets for 2025 (HM 
Government, 2013). These include a 50% faster 
delivery, 50% lower emissions, and a 33% 
reduction of clients' capital costs – business as 
usual won't meet this target. There is no doubt that 
eliminating (process and physical) waste from 
construction design and delivery is a necessary step 
towards achieving these goals. There is also no 
doubt that the adoption of lean production theories 
into construction has helped scholars and 
practitioners to understand and identify many of 
the causes and origins of waste in construction 
projects, in particular at the project delivery 
(production) phase. However, the prevailing 
understanding of waste, arguably, encourages the 
improvement of current processes rather than 
fundamental system redesign. Obtaining a better 
understanding and conceptualisation of waste in 
construction is therefore becoming more crucial to 
prepare the industry for the radical change 
demanded.  
Conceptualization of Waste in 
Construction 
The formal adaptation and transfer of the new 
production philosophies into construction projects 
has been ongoing since the early 1990’s (Koskela, 
1992). These philosophies were characterised as 
“lean” from the study of Toyota (Krafcik, 1988), 
and the term ‘Lean Construction’ rose to 
prominence with the formation of the International 
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Group for Lean Construction1 in 1993. The concept 
of lean was formally recommended to the UK 
construction industry by a Government report 
(Egan, 1998). Traditionally, the term 'waste in 
construction' is usually limited or intuitively linked 
to physical (material) waste. The concept of 
material waste in construction has been widely 
addressed but the widened understanding 
introduced by the seven process wastes identified 
in the Toyota Production System (TPS) (Ohno, 
1988) has struggled to be transferred. Process 
waste is directly associated with executing tasks 
and conforms to the current understanding of 
project management as ‘a specific set of operations 
designed to accomplish a singular goal’ (Project 
Management Institute2). In this way, production is 
defined as transforming resources towards the 
                                                        
1 www.iglc.net 
finished product or project and waste can be seen 
as the inefficient use of resources in the execution 
of tasks. The disadvantage of this understanding of 
waste is that it drives the improvement of current 
processes rather than radical new system design.  
Koskela (2000) advances the definition of lean 
production to the combination of transformation 
tasks (T), flow (F) and value creation (V). This 
definition of production as TFV creates two 
additional dimensions to the conceptualisation of 
waste as the inefficient use of resources in tasks. 
The first additional TFV dimension, flow (F), 
reveals the interdependency of activities across the 
whole project process. The consideration of flow 
brings the supply chain and the logistics of getting 
resources to the point of transformation into focus. 
Elevating flow to a project production driver also 
2 www.pmi.org 
Figure 1. Analysis and examples of waste in construction. Proportions based on studies by 
Diekmann et al. (2004) in the US and unpublished studies in the UK by Cameron Orr, AWD and 
Construction excellence as cited by Mossman (2009). Diagram adopted and modified from 
Mossman (2009) 
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alters the classification of process waste within 
tasks. For example, waiting within one task may 
now be necessary to expedite tasks downstream – 
this waiting is therefore no longer a waste and 
results in one task being sub-optimised in order to 
optimise the project. Consequently the pursuit of 
waste within transformation activities can itself 
become a cause of waste if it disrupts flow. Erratic 
and disrupted flow of processes provide further 
sources likely to cause waste recognised within 
TPS in two ways - the unevenness of workflow 
(Mura) and the related concept of the overburden 
of capacity (Muri) (Liker, 2004). 
The second additional TFV dimension is created by 
considering value creation (V) and brings the 
customer into focus. The construction sector 
typically identifies clients and more recently users 
and stakeholders – the term customer is not 
commonly used. However, the inclusion of value 
creation into project production moves the 
conceptualisation of waste towards identifying 
what causes value-loss and questions from whose 
perspective. This conceptualisation will vary from 
project to project and from customer to customer 
meaning the understanding of what constitutes 
value and how it is created becomes an important 
part of the design of the project production system 
(delivery including logistics, design and 
procurement) and the project product (the physical 
facility or asset created and what it achieves). One 
aspect of this conceptualisation is the consideration 
of the organisational, commercial and institutional 
environments that surround the design and delivery 
of construction projects. It is this aspect that leads 
to the primary research question:  
 
'Is there anything in the commercial and 
institutional environments surrounding 
construction that is blocking radical new 
production system design and therefore 
pinning the prevailing wasteful system in 
place?’  
 
The understanding of value and value loss (or 
waste) within these wider organisational, 
commercial and institutional environments is more 
difficult to determine not least because it requires a 
critical evaluation of the activities of different 
professions, for example lawyers, accountants, 
human resource managers, quantity surveyors to 
name a few. These environments and the 
professions within them also exhibit varying 
cultures, structures, systems and behaviours. Such 
an evaluation also needs to draw upon theory from 
disciplines outside both construction and 
manufacturing such as economics, law and 
sociology if it is to begin to explain the coherence 
and yet wastefulness of the current approaches to 
construction projects. 
 A contemporary study by Sarhan et al. (2017) 
reviewed the governance problems confronting 
clients and decision makers in construction 
procurement through the lens of Transaction Cost 
Economics. Their work led to novel explanations 
so as to why wasteful procurement practices 
persist, through an economic perspective. 
However, this study argues that an institutional 
perspective has the potential to add useful insights. 
Institutional theory gives significant consideration 
to context. It could also help to reveal the 
underlying fundamental paradigms that influence 
early project decisions and thus shape project 
performance and outcomes. 
An empirical study by Wearne (2014) reviewed the 
problems of project management as reported by 
1,879 individuals employed in the construction, 
manufacturing, process, and service industries in 
North-West Europe over 23 years. Interestingly 
when reviewing the data collected, the same 
categories of problems appeared to remain the 
main concern of project management. In an attempt 
to find answers so as to why many categories of 
project management problems persist, the analysis 
of his study reported that: 
 
 “More than 75% of the problems reported 
by the participants are due to institutional 
practices within organizations rather than 
inherent in their projects. Many of these 
problems of project management could 
therefore be avoided, or at least reduced by 
early attention to their causes. As a result 
much of what is called “fire- fighting” in 
project management—urgent actions on 
problems that should not have been 
allowed to occur—could be prevented” 
(Wearne, 2014, p. 72).  
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The findings of Wearne’s (2014) empirical study 
support recent arguments for improvement in the 
“front end” decisions on project objectives, plans 
and governance arrangements (for example, see 
Edkins et al., 2012). This reinforces the need to 
investigate the institutional factors that influence 
early-project decisions and condition project 
procurement and governance arrangements. In the 
construction management literature, there are very 
few, if any, studies that have sought to explore the 
relationship between institutional factors 
influencing construction procurement choices and 
practices, and waste in construction projects. 
Therefore, this study examines the current 
commercial and institutional arrangement within 
construction procurement and attempts to analyse 
them through the lens of Institutional theory. The 
study starts by providing a brief overview of the 
concept of waste-reduction in construction. 
Following this, the study illustrates the significance 
of conceptualising construction procurement 
systems as institutional arrangements. Next, the 
study reviews behavioural explanations provided 
by Institutional theory of organisational studies. 
Subsequently, the study demonstrates how the neo-
institutional theory, a branch of organizational 
sociology, has the potential to be used as an 
analytical lens to deliver a more explicit theory of 
waste relating cause and effect within the wider 
aspects of construction procurement systems and 
relationships. The term 'waste' is almost always 
synonymous with physical waste (i.e. on-site 
material waste). However, throughout the 
following sections of this paper, the term 'waste' 
refers to the wider conceptualisation of waste as 
summarised above. 
Literature Review Methodology 
This study hopes to shed light on a source of waste 
hitherto unacknowledged in construction. This, 
therefore, requires an in-depth review of selected 
relevant literature, with the intension of searching 
for latent themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This 
interpretative work entails a thorough review of the 
underlying ideas, assumptions, and 
conceptualisations informing the content of the 
data. For this reason, a generic purposive sampling 
strategy (Bryman, 2012) was adopted for literature 
review. This strategy is not driven by the statistical 
imperative of including every available study. 
Instead, it puts the research questions under 
investigation at the forefront of sampling 
considerations (Bryman, 2012). According to 
Doyle (2003, p. 326), a purposive sample is more 
appropriate than an exhaustive one, when the aim 
is explanation rather than prediction. Through this 
approach, the researcher decides what needs to be 
known, and deliberately chooses suitable literature 
which can potentially provide the most relevant 
information and have the largest impact on the 
enhancement of knowledge (Patton, 2015, p.276).   
Based on these considerations, the study targeted 
peer-reviewed papers published by top journals 
using electronic search engines (e.g. University's 
Library OneSearch and Google Scholar) and hand-
searching of peer-reviewed papers published by 
proceedings of the Annual Conference of the 
International Group for Lean Construction (IGLC). 
The main keywords and topics that were searched 
for and reviewed included: waste-minimisation in 
construction, wasteful attitudes and behaviours in 
construction projects, opportunistic practices, 
omission errors, conflicts and disputes, relationship 
between procurement and value loss, hidden 
transaction costs in construction projects, barriers 
to partnering, barriers to relational forms of 
contracting, barriers to lean and integrated project 
delivery, and changing roles of clients and 
professional service providers. As a result of this 
effort, 35 waste-related studies and 76 construction 
procurement and contractual related articles, 
ranging from 1994 to 2017, were identified and 
thoroughly reviewed. When qualitatively analysing 
the articles, a table of information, that categorises 
information extracted from each paper, was created 
to help the authors with organising their thoughts 
(See Appendix 1). 
The Concept of Waste-
Reduction in Construction 
The concept of waste-reduction has been 
fundamentally used as a key driver for 
improvement in the manufacturing industry, and 
arguably led to great achievements; but it has not 
been as prevalent in construction economics or 
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management (Koskela and Ballard, 2012; Koskela 
et al., 2012; Bølviken and Koskela, 2016). 
Research efforts aimed at understanding waste are 
relatively limited when compared to other topics in 
construction, and many waste-related studies 
continue to focus on the causes rather than the root 
causes. Two subsequent systematic literature 
reviews on empirical studies that relate to waste-
minimisation in construction (Viana et al., 2012; 
Formoso et al., 2015) revealed that research is 
broadly focused on addressing three different 
categories of waste:  
 
1. Construction material waste (physical 
waste);  
2. Specific sorts of waste (such as accidents 
and rework). 
3. Non value-adding activities (process 
waste); 
 
Many studies in construction literature have 
concentrated on ‘waste-management’ strategies 
and implementation efforts on construction project 
sites (for example, Peng et al., 1997; Mcdonald and 
Smithers, 1998; Lawson et al., 2001). These 
studies have broadly focused on identifying and 
assessing strategies for re-using and recycling 
construction material waste, waste-quantification, 
waste management mapping to help with the 
handling of on-site waste, investigating the impact 
of legislation on waste management practices, 
suggesting improvements in on-site waste 
management practices, and developing on-site 
waste auditing and assessment tools (Osmani, 
2012). The current approaches to research in the 
field of construction waste-minimisation are 
mainly focused on designing out waste (e.g. Keys 
et al., 2000); waste minimisation guides for 
architects and designers (e.g. WRAP, 2009); 
attitudes, perceptions and behavioural factors  
towards construction waste minimisation (e.g. 
Osmani et al., 2008; Begum et al., 2009); the need 
for improved supply chain integration (e.g. Dainty 
and Brooke, 2004), and procurement waste 
minimisation strategies (Gamage et al, 2009).  
There are also some other research studies that 
have focused on specific types of waste such as: 
rework and design error reduction (e.g. Busby and 
Hughes, 2004; Love et al., 2009, 2011a, 2013; 
Feng and Tommelein, 2009) knowledge flow and 
integration in different construction working 
environments (e.g. Ruan et al., 2012), designing for 
construction worker safety (e.g. Toole and 
Gambatese, 2008), reducing waste by appropriate 
coordination mechanisms (Sandberg and Bildsten, 
2011), and project disputes causations (Love et al., 
2011b; Mitropoulos and Howell, 2001). However, 
most of the studies that have investigated process 
waste and non-value adding activities have been 
undertaken by members of the lean construction 
community. There are many general classifications 
of process waste as defined in lean thinking. For 
example, they include Tachii Ohno’s seven wastes: 
transportation, inventory, motion, waiting, over-
production, over-processing, and defects (Ohno 
1988, pp. 19-20). In addition, the waste of human 
potential - e.g. ‘Not speaking, not listening’ by 
Macomber & Howel (2004), and the ‘Making-do’ 
waste presented by Koskela (2004) is included 
within this category. 
An overall analysis of waste-related literature in 
construction reveals five critical issues. First, 
researchers have gradually shifted their attention 
and studies from a mere focus on waste-
management strategies that have mainly been 
concerned with the consequences of waste, to the 
promotion of waste-minimisation strategies, as a 
more sustainable approach that eliminates or 
reduces construction material waste at its source. 
Secondly, most of these waste-minimisation 
approaches, if not all, were directed towards 
finding means for reducing construction material 
waste (physical waste) as opposed to process 
waste. Other important issues such as time waste 
and value creation are much less explicitly 
explored.  
Thirdly, there is no doubt that many of the 
problems that lead to the occurrence of waste in 
construction are strongly related to lean theories 
adopted in production management. However, it 
can still be argued that waste is created primarily 
from project-organisational and contractual 
problems (Williamson, 1991, pp.78-79); and as 
such, a focus on waste reduction in site-based 
production alone would be insufficient. As 
emphasised by Matthews et al. (2003), it is difficult 
to maximise value and minimise waste at the 
project level if the prevailing contractual structure 
hinders coordination, constrains collaboration and 
innovation, and sub-optimises performance and 
The Engineering Project Organization Journal (January 2018) Volume 8  
 
 
The Engineering Project Organization Journal 
©2017 Engineering Project Organization Society 
www.epossociety.org 
goals. Similarly, this study argues that procurement 
systems, as institutional arrangements, are 
designed to assign liabilities and authorities to 
people and organizations (Love et al., 1998) at the 
project and programme levels; and thus structure 
the borders that shape ‘the play of the game’ 
(Williamson, 2000). From a production 
management perspective, organisation and 
contracts are essential parts of the production 
system design; and thus there is no doubt that 
poorly aligned (imperfect) organisational and 
institutional arrangements may cause waste and 
impact on project outcomes (Koskela and Ballard, 
2012).  Fourthly, a small but growing number of 
studies have attempted to investigate the influence 
of procurement processes on the generation of 
waste in construction projects (e.g. Jaques, 2000; 
Gamage et al., 2009). However all of these studies 
have only focused on the relationship between 
different procurement systems and the generation 
of construction material waste.  
Finally, very limited, if any, waste-related studies 
have devoted attention to exploring performance-
shaping mechanisms (i.e. systems and structural 
arrangements), as well as the institutional context 
in which human actions and decisions are 
constituted. In the construction management 
literature, there are hardly any studies that have 
sought to investigate the role played by 
institutional processes, within the construction 
procurement context, in embedding waste in 
construction projects. Waste here can be in the 
form of monetary, time or effort and can pre or post 
contract stages.  
The Construction Procurement 
Context 
Construction Procurement Systems 
A common theme of construction literature is the 
proliferation of definitions of a procurement 
system (See for e.g. Sharif and Morledge, 1994; 
Love et al., 1998; Masterman, 2002; Watermeyer, 
2012). Both terms: `contractual arrangement’ and 
`procurement system’ are often used 
synonymously (Love et al., 1998). Similarly, 
procurement approaches and additional contract 
price provisions (e.g. lump sum, guaranteed 
maximum price, target cost, cost plus) are also 
commonly regarded as closely related (Oyegoke et 
al., 2009). Interestingly, a study by Tookey et al. 
(2001) found that, in industrial practice, clients 
usually make amendments to mitigate risk and add 
usability to rigidly prescribed procurement systems 
that are imposed, in their view, by researchers and 
consultants when classifying procurement routes. 
For convenience, the definition adopted here is that 
a construction procurement system is  a 'project-
organisation system that arranges and governs the 
way that the parties involved can compete and/or 
cooperate in order to achieve their agreed 
programme and project goals’. Inspired by  
Masterman’s (2002) forth-fold of procurement 
methods, Love et al's (1998) categorization of 
building procurement systems, Kumrasawy and 
Dissanayaka's (1998) hierarchy or procurement 
options, and Watermeyer's (2011) framework for 
developing a construction procurement strategy, 
this study further conceptualises major 
construction procurement arrangements as shown 
in Figure 2, and Table 1 below.  
Construction Procurement 
Subsystems and Options 
Procurement subsystems or/and procedures are 
identical terms that are commonly used in 
literature. Previous studies have integrated specific 
procurement sub-systems to their hierarchy of 
procurement systems, when investigating the 
relationship between procurement systems, project 
parameters, and certain aspects of project-
performance such as: time, cost, quality, work 
environment, and innovation (Kumaraswamy and 
Dissanayaka, 1998; Love, 2002; Eriksson and 
Laan, 2007; Eriksson and Westerberg, 2011). For 
example, the main procurement sub-systems 
conceptualised by Kumaraswamy and Dissanayaka 
(1998) are: work packages; functional groupings 
(i.e. separated, integrated and management-led); 
payment modalities; standard sets of contract forms 
or conditions; and selection methodologies. 
Similarly, Watermeyer (2012) suggested that 
procurement and contracting arrangements 
comprise: procurement selection strategy; 
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procurement evaluation strategy; contracting 
strategy (functional groupings); pricing strategy; 
and form of contract. 
In a conceptual study by Eriksson and Westerberg 
(2011) which developed a hypothetical 
procurement framework that examines how 
various procurement-related factors affect project 
performance criteria, procurement procedures at 
the buying stage were divided into three categories 
according to their relation to: competition, co-
opetition and cooperation. These procurement 
procedures consisted of: design; tendering; bid 
evaluation, subcontractor selection; payment; use 
of collaborative tools; and performance evaluation. 
Thus, for instance, subcontractors’ selection-
decisions made by either the contractor or the client 
would be related to competitive procurement 
procedures; joint selection with single 
responsibility would be a co-opetitive procedure; 
while joint selection with shared responsibilities 
would be regarded as cooperative.  
Compellingly, very limited studies in construction 
management have explicitly considered and 
integrated, as part of their hierarchy of procurement 
systems, other critical procurement subsystems 
such as: insurance arrangements, bonds, collateral 
warranties, and alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms, despite their significant importance 
and influence on project-teamwork performance. 
Building on the work of Wordley (1991); 
Kumaraswamy and Dissanayaka (1998), Love et 
al. (1998); Hughes et al (2000); Sherif and kaka 
(2003); Eriksson and Laan (2007); Ghassemi and 
Becerik-Gerber (2011); Masterman (2011),  
Figure 2: Major construction procurement systems and sub-systems 
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Table 1: Major options available within construction procurement subsystems 
 
Procurement 
subsystem 
/Procedure 
Possible Options 
Work packaging 
 Break down based on contract value (e.g. large packaging to be employed for the 
purpose of high price competition, or small packaging if specialist expertise is 
required) 
 Divisions based on geographical divisions or functional and disciplinary divisions 
of contracts 
 Design based on sequence or interdependence of activities 
 Design based on Project risks and the allocation of responsibilities, or project needs 
Form of contracts  
 Standard un-amended set of contract forms and conditions from recognised bodies 
(e.g. FIDIC, NEC3, ICE, JCT,  contracts)   
 Amended standard forms of contract which include special conditions of contract 
(e.g. special risk transfer/allocation, length of guarantee and additional insurance) 
 Multi-party agreement forms of contract (e.g. PPC2000) 
 Discrete/Bespoke contracts (custom-made)  
Selection 
methodologies 
(Bid-evaluations) 
 High weight on tender price  
 Equal weight on price and soft parameters  
 High weight on soft parameters (e.g. competence, reputation, capacity, 
collaborative-ability, and experience) 
Payment 
mechanism  
 Advanced payments 
 Milestone payments 
 Interim payments (e.g. Monthly payments) 
 Stage payments 
 Incentive/disincentive payments 
 Shared gain/pain arrangements/Target cost  
Insurance systems  
 Traditional insurance arrangements;  
 Single project-insurance option 
Warranties  
 Collateral warranties; or  
 latent defect insurance 
Tendering 
approach  
 
 Competitive open bid procedures with or without post-qualifications (one or two 
stage tendering);  
 Selected- limited bid invitation - with or without pre-qualifications; (one or two-
stage tendering)  
 Direct negotiation with one preferred supplier (no tender) 
Pricing strategy 
 Price-based (e.g. Lump sum; Guaranteed maximum price; Bills of quantities; Price 
list/schedule; Activity-based scheduling) 
 Cost-based (e.g. cost-reimbursement; Target cost; and Target value design) 
 Mixed 
Performance 
evaluation 
mechanisms  
 Output control by client - inspection of the outcome 
 Process control by client - ongoing monitoring 
 Social control - Self-control by contractor  
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Eriksson and Westerberg (2011); Mante et al. 
(2012); Ndekugri et al. (2013); and Pasquire et al., 
(2015), Table 1, provides the major options 
available within procurement sub-systems, as 
conceptualised within this study. 
There is no doubt that the deployment of efficient 
procurement arrangements (i.e. procurement 
systems, sub-systems and options) may increase 
the likelihoods of ’project success’ and overall 
client satisfaction in a particular project context 
(Kumaraswamy and Dissanayak, 1998). However, 
in order to optimise the whole, it is important to 
consider the influence of the interactions between 
the sub-systems on the output of the main 
procurement system (Kumaraswamy and 
Dissanayak, 1998). It is also critical to ensure the 
compatibility of the chosen procurement options 
from within each sub-system with the selected 
project delivery system, client and project needs, 
and other contextual conditions that bear on the 
project (Kumaraswamy and Dissanayak, 1998). 
For instance, it may be unsuitable to choose a cost-
reimbursement pricing option for a traditionally 
procured project (Love et al., 1998). Similarly, it 
would be inefficient to adapt a bid evaluation 
strategy based on lowest tender price for the 
selection of project team members of a partnering 
project (Eriksson et al., 2008). Thus, it is suggested 
that procurement arrangements should be crafted to 
support production system requirements and 
improve flow processes, rather than being based on 
cost and risk-averse considerations that may lead to 
sub-optimisation (Sarhan et al., 2017). The premise 
here is based on 'optimising the whole' rather than 
'optimising the parts'.  
Based on these arguments, it is thus ironic how that 
an empirical survey (Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003), 
that was conducted in the Canadian and the United 
States construction industries, revealed that  
inappropriate risk allocation through disclaimer 
(exculpatory) clauses in contracts is still the 
general traditional practice in the construction 
industry; and that their use is prevalent to an extent 
that they continue to be utilized in some of the 
newer contractual agreements such as 
Table 1 (Continued): Major options available within construction procurement subsystems 
 
Strategy for 
achieving 
‘Secondary 
Objectives’  
(e.g.  promoting 
sustainability, 
enhancing health 
and safety 
performance 
beyond statutory 
requirements, and 
poverty 
alleviation) 
 Through the use of incentives that are provided in the form of tender evaluation 
points 
 Through financial incentives for attaining key performance indicators  
 Via contractual obligations and mandatory subcontracting requirements 
Dispute resolution 
mechanisms 
(DRM) 
 Conventional DRMs (i.e. litigation, arbitration, adjudication) 
 Alternative DRMs (e.g. Mediation, conciliation, early neutral evaluation, 
Partnering) 
Bondings / 
Safeguarding 
approaches 
 Performance/Surety bonds  
 Bank Guarantees  
 Standby letters of credit  
 Cash retentions  
 Parent company guarantee 
 No need for use of bonds as a means of safeguarding - Instead the focus is on pre-
qualifications, direct negotiation, single project insurance and  
collaborative/relation-based delivery approaches 
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partnering/alliances. Similarly, it is interesting that 
the clients of many projects that have been 
procured using an integrated project delivery (IPD) 
system still rely on the use of performance/surety 
bonds and traditional insurance arrangements, 
despite the latter in particular being identified by 
leading industry professionals in the US as one of 
the biggest worries for the adoption of IPD to its 
full capacity (Kent, and Becerik-Gerber, 2010; 
Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber, 2011). That is 
because it was found that traditional insurance 
products impose liability issues on each project-
party separately and thus make collaboration 
complicated. The same has been asserted by expert 
construction professionals in the UK who 
suggested that conventional arrangements for 
providing insurance cover add unnecessary costs to 
constructions projects, and can also obstruct 
collaboration between supply chains (Ndekugri et 
al., 2013). According to Mossman et al. (2010, p. 
11)  
 
"If each party to a relational agreement is 
required to have its own insurance and 
there is a claim during design or 
construction, an insurance company could 
force parties to sue one another in order to 
trigger insurance coverage, threatening 
relationships".  
 
These examples suggest the existence of serious 
power disparities within the construction market 
place; this in turn allows actors with power, and 
who may have vested interests for the wide-spread 
use of some imperfect procurement arrangements, 
to dictate the rules of the game - the way we do 
business. Winch (2000a), suggested a number of 
different factors, yet often working in combination, 
that could allow some actors in a business system 
to become relatively powerful compared to others. 
These were identified by him as those possessing 
the following capabilities: 
 
 Ability to solve complex problems for the 
client - e.g. the traditional role of the 
architect and the consultant engineer in the 
British system which provides them with 
the privilege to solve complex problems 
for the client through the briefing process. 
 The blessing of the state (e.g. statutory 
protection) - For instance, in many 
countries (e.g. France and Germany) only 
the architect can apply for building 
permissions. 
 Ability to manage risk for the client - This 
includes control actors, such as the 
quantity surveyor, in the UK, whose role 
was developed to mediate the power of the 
general contractor on behalf of the client. 
The Significance of Procurement as 
Institutional Arrangements 
Construction business systems are regarded as 
institutions (Winch, 2000a&b; Sha, 2004) that are 
created in countries to specify ‘the rules of the 
game’, and regulate the relations and interactions 
between the different parties involved in the 
industry. The evolution of these business systems 
are path dependent and also heavily reliant on the 
cultural and regulative context within each country 
(Sha, 2004; Matos-Castano et al., 2014). In other 
words, the national context leads to the formation 
of specific business systems which in turn 
influence the orientation, strategies and 
performance of individual firms in nationally 
distinctive ways (Winch, 2000a). Similarly, this 
study argues that procurement systems, as 
institutional arrangements, are designed to assign 
liabilities and authorities to people and 
organizations (Love et al., 1998) at the programme 
and project levels; and thus structure the boarders 
that shape ‘the play of the game’ (Williamson, 
2000). Inappropriate procurement arrangements 
may lead to time and cost overruns, adversarial 
relationships between project parties, and 
ultimately the failure of projects (Kumaraswamy 
and Dissanayaka, 1998; Mante et al., 2012; 
Watermeyer, 2012). Thus, there is a wide 
agreement among scholars and many clients on the 
fact that getting the construction procurement 
context right is central to project success (Latham, 
1994; Love et al., 1998; Tookey et al., 2001; 
Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Osipova and Eriksson, 
2011).  
The construction industry has, over a long period, 
been subject to substantial criticism for its 
opportunistic relationships, with conflicts and 
disputes, and lack of trust, collaboration and 
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customer focus often cited as significant amongst 
its various shortcomings (Egan; 1998; Rooke et al., 
2003; Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Love et al., 2010). 
Hence, traditional procurement arrangements (e.g. 
separated methods) are potential root causes for the 
opportunism and lack of cooperation that 
characterise many construction projects (Eriksson 
and Laan, 2007; Osipova and Eriksson, 2011), the 
industry has been urged to start using new and less 
familiar procurement systems (e.g. partnering and 
alliancing) that are believed to be capable of 
enhancing collaboration, commitment and trust 
between project parties (Egan, 1998). However, 
despite the strong advocacy for the use of 
partnering and of the potential benefits that it could 
attain, its implementation in the construction 
industry generally remains patchy rather than 
widespread (Phua, 2006; Eriksson et al., 2008). 
The same applies to other innovative delivery 
approaches such as the integrated project delivery 
(IPD) system (Kent and Becerik-Gerber, 2010). It 
is thus questionable why traditional procurement 
arrangements still remain very prevalent in the 
construction industry (RICS, 2004; CIOB, 2010; 
RIBA, 2013), and have not, yet, been replaced by 
more collaborative/relation-based procurement 
arrangements (e.g. partnering and framework 
agreements) that are deemed to be more efficient. 
Even when partnering is utilised, the relationship 
between contractors and subcontractors is often 
regarded as ‘mere ceremony’ (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977) and aimed at signalling legitimacy to key 
observers (Greenwood, 2001). Thus, this is a 
fundamental question since there are substantial 
trends towards cooperative ways of working as a 
means for improving project performance and 
outcomes. A number of theoretical perceptions 
exist in literature to predict and explain the reasons 
for the establishment, process and outcomes of 
several forms of institutional and organisational 
arrangements. Out of these, three principal theories 
seem to provide profound conceptual insights:  
 
1. Transaction cost economics (TCE) (see 
Williamson, 1975, 1985);   
2. Resource-dependence Theory (RDT) (see 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978); and 
3. Neo-institutional theory of organisational 
studies (see Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2005).  
A common conceptual assumption amongst all is 
that social or economic actors make rational, albeit 
bounded, and purposive decisions about the types 
of contractual and organisational arrangements, 
that they would form or join, depending on what 
they conceive to be most beneficial (Phua, 2006). 
However, it is important to realise that not all 
institutional and organisational arrangements are 
cost-based (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). For 
instance, the theory of institutional isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), in contrast to TCE 
and RDT, has established that many organisational 
arrangements are not necessarily formed based on 
efficiency considerations only. Instead, some are 
also formed due to imitation, mere ceremony 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977), or the fact that that they 
are widely shared, disseminated, and taken for 
granted throughout an organisational field (e.g. the 
construction industry) (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983).  
An empirical survey study of 87 professional 
construction clients in Sweden was conducted by 
Eriksson et al., (2008) to identify the critical 
barriers to partnering; and to analyse the 
correlations between clients' perceptions of these 
barriers, and their actual behaviour in the form of 
procurement procedures. The study found that the 
clients' desired objective of increasing cooperation 
between project parties does not affect their 
procurement procedures. Clients perceive 
partnering and cooperative arrangements to be 
significant and beneficial, but still heavily rely on 
the use of procurement procedures that foster 
competition and adversarial relationships. The 
authors offered two possible explanations for these 
contradictory results. First, that clients may not be 
aware of how their procurement decisions and 
procedures may affect their likelihoods of creating 
a cooperative environment (Eriksson et al., 2008), 
and thus impact on project performance and 
outcomes. Secondly, that clients may not be 
incentivised enough to adapt less familiar 
procurement arrangements that are potentially 
more efficient than conventional approaches 
(Eriksson et al., 2008).  
This lack of incentive for the use of partnering or 
other collaborative modalities (i.e. lean 
construction) has been attributed by scholars to 
several factors such as: lack of adequate awareness 
and understanding and top management 
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commitment (Erikkson et al., 2008; Sarhan and 
Fox, 2013), and the fact that the construction 
industry operates in a very competitively cost-
driven environment (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000). 
This issue could also be linked to the phenomena 
described by Bresnen and Haslam (1991) as 
"habituation", which occurs as experienced clients 
establish a 'close-minded' approach to building, 
thereby merely utilizing those procurement 
procedures that are most familiar to them (Love et 
al., 1998). Additionally, it could be argued that 
many clients conform to imperfect conventional 
procurement procedures, due to institutional 
pressure imposed on them (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Sarhan et al., 2017). Most construction 
clients are inexperienced or one-off procurers of 
construction projects (Love et al., 2010); and as 
such, they invariably rely on professional advice 
from consultants, financiers and legal advisers. 
These professional advisers may have a vested 
interest (i.e. social and/or economic motivations) 
for the wide-spread use of specific procurement 
arrangements that may be inefficient in comparison 
to other newer alternatives (Pasquire et al., 2015). 
Apart from purely economic-based determinants, 
very few studies in the construction management 
literature have been conducted to investigate the 
role played by institutional determinants in 
predicting the establishment of project-
organisational arrangements, of which partnering 
as a collaborative procurement system is one. To 
fill this gap, Phua (2006) carried out a survey study 
completed by 526 firms covering various industry 
disciplines in Hong Kong, in order to shed some 
empirical light on the reason for the apparent 
limited use of partnering arrangements in the 
construction industry. More specifically, the study 
focussed on investigating whether using an 
institutional framework could help to provide some 
useful explanations as to when partnering is likely 
to occur. Compellingly, the findings have shown 
that institutional forces far outweigh the 
significance of economic forces in determining 
whether or not firms will adopt partnering. It was 
found that none of the financial incentives in terms 
of increased profitability, competitiveness or 
likelihood of increased resource acquisition and 
reallocation had any significant impact on firms’ 
decisions to adopt partnering at all. Instead, the 
results showed that the majority of construction 
firms have not adopted partnering as an alternative 
to traditional procurement methods, due to the lack 
of strong institutional partnering norms in the 
industry. According to Phua (2006, p.622): 
 
"Because the benefits or more precisely the 
economic and management advantages 
that firms could gain from using partnering 
are still debatable and difficult to measure, 
there is no a priori reason to expect firms 
to favour its use over other procurement 
methods other than the fact that there are 
obvious institutional norms that propel 
firms to use it". 
 
The premise of institutional theory is that 
individual (i.e. persons) and collective (i.e. 
organisations) social actors are expected to comply 
with institutional forces imposed on them, because 
those that conform 'are rewarded through increased 
legitimacy, resources, and survival capabilities’ 
(Scott, 1987, p. 498).  When the same institutional 
forces continue to exist over time, firms within 
relatively circumscribed fields that are bounded by 
shared understandings and mutual dependence 
(Scott, 2012) become more homogenous 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983); and thus a dominant 
organisational arrangement, or 'proto-institution' 
(Lawrence et al., 2002), is likely to occur (Phua, 
2006). Thus, as a corollary, it is argued that the 
extent to which actors are inclined to the use of 
imperfect procurement arrangements (e.g. 
traditional procurement systems), that are deemed 
to be inefficient in comparison to other more 
innovative and collaborative approaches, is a 
function of how deeply entrenched the institutional 
environment is with respect to rules, technologies, 
norms, beliefs and expectations that are associated 
with the concerned practices. Having considered 
the factors that influence the emergence of 
organisational arrangements; as well as the impact 
of procurement systems, as institutional 
arrangements, on project-team performance and 
outcomes, the focus now shifts to an introduction 
of institutional theory and subsequently an 
exploration of neo-institutional theory. 
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Background of Institutional 
Theory 
Institutional theory has a long and complex history 
dating back to the mid-nineteenth century and 
incorporates the pioneering insights of seminal 
scholars of the social sciences such as Max Webber 
(Scott, 2005). Old institutional arguments relied on 
notions that ‘institutional contexts structure action’. 
According to Meyer (2008) ‘Individuals were seen 
as creatures of habit groups as controlled by 
customs and societies as organized around culture’ 
(p. 790). Theories stretched from the economic to 
political and religious fields, emphasising more 
organisational or cultural forms of control. 
However, in general, the nature of institutions and 
their forms of control over action were always 
subject to a lack of clarity and consensus in social 
scientific thinking (Meyer, 2008). 
The old institutionalism was encountered by 
constant debates about free will and determinism; 
as it saw humans, groups and organisations as 
naturally embedded entities in broad cultural and 
structural contexts. In brief, the old institutionalism 
was marginalised by the rise of the social sciences 
of modernity, where conceptions were built around 
notions of society being comprised of empowered, 
fairly rational, and rather free actors (Meyer, 2008). 
These actors include individuals, governments, and 
the organisations created by people and 
governments. In addition, much of the work 
focused on institutionalism from these periods was 
subsumed in the storming advances of neoclassical 
theory in economics, behaviouralism in political 
science, and positivism in sociology. Further 
development by John Meyer and his colleagues at 
Stanford University led to a significant revival for 
the ideas of institutionalism from 1977, with the 
formulation of neo-institutional theory (Scott, 
2005; 2008). 
Neo-Institutional Theory 
The neo-institutional theory developed in response 
to specific processes and structures (i.e. causes of 
structural change in organisations) that were not 
adequately explained by prevailing rational-actor 
and contingency theories (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Mahalingam and Levitt, 2007). For example, 
bureaucratic organisations continued to follow 
rules that in some cases conflicted with the 
organisations’ own goals. The general argument 
advanced by the foundational work of Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) was that formal organisational 
structures reflected institutional forces instead of 
technological requirements and resource 
dependencies. They argued that many of the 
models giving rise to organisations are based on 
rationalised myths and rule-like frameworks that 
depend for their efficacy on imitation and the fact 
that they are widely shared and disseminated.  
In brief, conventional neo-institutionalism 
literature, in replication of the old institutionalism, 
emphasised the ways by which institutions 
constrained and directed people (now perceived as 
bounded, purposive and empowered actors) to 
behave in certain regular, relatively rational, but 
homogeneous and expected ways (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). With more than 30 years of progress 
since neo-institutional theory penetrated 
organisational sociology, the theory has been 
subject to various developments including 
reformulation of some of its arguments. Next, three 
significant areas of development, which are most 
relevant to the study, will be briefly highlighted 
(for a fuller review, see Scott, 2008). 
Institutional Isomorphism 
In the 1970s, when research efforts were focussed 
on understanding the reasons for variations 
amongst the kind (i.e. structural features) of 
organisations, seminal work by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) sought to explain homogeneity of 
organisations and practices rather than their 
variations. Their contention was that: "Highly 
structured organisation fields provide a context in 
which individual efforts to deal rationally with 
uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the 
aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, culture, 
and output" (p. 144). They described this 
phenomenon as institutional isomorphic change, 
which occurs through three mechanisms:  
 
 
 
 
The Engineering Project Organization Journal (January 2018) Volume 8  
 
 
The Engineering Project Organization Journal 
©2017 Engineering Project Organization Society 
www.epossociety.org 
1. ‘Coercive isomorphism’ that results from 
political forces and legitimacy issues;  
2. ‘Mimetic isomorphism’ occurring due to 
standard responses to uncertainty; and 
3. ‘Normative isomorphism’ associated with 
professionalisation.  
 
Organisational fields can be defined as those 
independent actors (i.e. persons and organisations), 
within somewhat circumscribed arenas, that 
produce similar services or products and constitute 
a shared culture and social sub-system (Scott, 
2008, 2012). The logic for applying work at 
organisational field levels is that it provides us with 
a more systematic level of analysis; as attention is 
shifted from focussing merely on 'organisations in 
environments' to focussing on the 'organisation of 
the environment', with particular consideration to 
organisations as the key players of the field (Scott, 
2008).  
Institutional Pillars and Carriers 
Institutional theory has been widely employed 
among social, economic and political sciences to 
examine systems ranging from micro-interpersonal 
interactions to macro global frameworks. Despite 
the fact that the theory had multiple roots; there is 
a wide consensus that institutions matter (Peng et 
al., 2009). Nevertheless, social scholars in various 
ways were adopting the theory, and there seemed 
to be a crucial need to move from a looser to a 
tighter conceptualisation. For this reason, iconic 
sociologist W. Richard Scott provided a 
comprehensive conceptual schema (see Table 2), 
based on his extensive survey to institutional 
literature, that guides directions for pursuing such 
a theory. Scott defined institutions as: ‘regulative, 
normative, and cultural/cognitive systems and 
structures that, together with associated activities 
and resources, provide stability and meaning to 
social life’ (Scott, 2001, p. 48). His aim was not to 
provide a new integrated theory of institutions, but 
instead to better enable us to capture both the 
commonality and the diversity of past and present 
conceptions of institutional theory (Scott, 2008).  
Hence legitimacy is a primary requisite of any 
stable social order, the three pillars are analytically 
distinguished to stress that although interrelated, 
but they work through varying mechanisms and 
distinctive motives for compliance (Scott, 2012). 
For instance, a 'regulative' perspective evaluates 
legitimacy according to the extent that systems 
operate in conformance to relevant legal or quasi-
legal requirements. Alternatively, a 'normative' 
view asserts a moral basis for evaluating 
legitimacy; while a cultural-cognitive conception 
refers to the orthodox and taken for granted 
features of social life that widely shared beliefs 
within a community make possible (Scott, 2012). 
Table 2. Scott’s Typology of Institutional Pillars and Carriers (Scott, 2001) 
 
Pillars 
Carriers Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Symbolic 
Systems 
Rules, laws Values, expectations 
Categories, typifications, 
schema 
Relational 
Systems 
Governance & power systems 
Regimes, authority 
systems 
Structural isomorphism 
identities 
Routines 
Protocols, Standard Operating 
Procedures 
Jobs, roles, obedience to 
duty 
Scripts 
Artifacts 
Objects complying with 
mandated specifications 
Objects meeting 
conventions, standards 
Objects possessing 
symbolic value 
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Strategic Responses to Institutional 
Pressure 
Institutional theory pays significant attention to the 
context. It considers the processes by which 
structures including rules, norms, and routines 
become established as authoritative guidelines for 
social behaviour. Much of the early studies of 
institutional theory emphasised that organisations 
and actors, operating within a specific context, 
were pressurised to conform to the requirements 
and constraints of their institutional environment 
(e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Organisations’ 
self-interested rewards obtained from conformance 
to these institutional forces include, for example, 
legitimacy, enhancing likelihood of survival, social 
support, stability, access to resources, acceptance 
in professions, and expedience to avoid 
questioning (Oliver, 1991). For these reasons, the 
prevalent language used was one of ‘institutional 
effects’, thereby inferring a determinant ‘top-
down’ argument (Scott, 2005).  
This unilateral perspective based on obedient 
organisations defocussed attentions of institutional 
scholars away from the fact that social structures 
are continuously modified by the individual and 
collective actions of social actors. Thus, according 
to Scott (2008), one of the important advances to 
the progress of institutional theory is the 
introduction of agented actors and accordingly the 
rise of interactive arguments, which suggest that 
‘institutional processes’ can operate in both ‘top-
down’ and ‘bottom up’ directions. This was 
important because it allows us to also identify the 
social actors who held the widely shared beliefs, or 
were enforcing taken for granted norms (Scott, 
2005). 
It was the seminal work of Oliver (1991) who 
affirmed the role of organisational self-interest and 
active agency within institutional contexts; by 
cleverly integrating resource-dependence 
predictions of organisational strategy with the more 
limited responses to institutional pressures that 
traditional institutional models provoked. She 
pointed out that although acquiescence to 
institutional processes is the most likely response 
by organisations and their leaders; strategic 
responses could range from passive to active 
resistance as follows: acquiescence; compromise; 
avoid; defy; and manipulate. Accordingly, 
organisational reactions to institutional pressure 
towards conformity will depend on five 
institutional antecedents (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Institutional antecedents of strategic responses (extracted from Oliver, 1991) 
 
Institutional 
Factor 
Research Question Predictive Dimensions 
Cause 
Why is the organisation being 
pressurised to conform to institutional 
rules or expectations? 
 Legitimacy or social fitness; 
 Efficiency or economic fitness 
Constituents 
Who is asserting the institutional 
pressure on the organisation? 
 Multiplicity of constituent demands; 
 Dependency on institutional constituents 
Content 
To what norms or requirements is the 
organisation being pressurised to 
conform? 
 Consistency with organisational goals; 
 Discretionary constituents imposed on 
the organisation; 
Control 
How or by what means are the 
institutional pressures being exerted? 
 Legal coercion or enforcement; 
 Voluntary diffusion of norms; 
Context 
What is the environmental context within 
which institutional pressures are being 
exerted? 
 Environmental uncertainty; 
 Environmental interconnectedness 
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Institutional Waste Within 
Construction 
Based on this study’s hypothesis—that there are 
systems, structural arrangements and cognitive 
undergirding assumptions that support and 
encourage wasteful activities in construction—and 
building on the seminal studies of DiMaggio and 
Powell’s (1983) institutional isomorphism, Scott’s 
(2001) three pillars of institutionalism, and 
Oliver’s (1991) topology of strategic responses; 
institutional waste is defined as:  
 
‘the regulative, normative, and cognitive-
culture institutional processes which 
support and/or encourage wasteful 
activities, that the construction industry 
(organisation field) accedes to in the form 
of habitual, imitation or compliance; in 
order to achieve legitimacy, security and 
survival  at the price of production 
efficiency and effectiveness’.  
Effectiveness refers to the extent to which a right 
target is achieved with resources applied (i.e. value 
and client satisfaction). Efficiency is the evaluation 
of how economically the resources are utilised to 
meet client requirements, based on production flow 
perspectives (Koskela, 2000). By habitual, here, 
the study means: adhering to invisible, widely 
shared and taken for granted norms that have been 
historically repeated; by imitation: consciously or 
unconsciously mimicking what other more 
successful organisations do and strictly following 
imperfect advice from consulting firms and 
professional institutions; and by compliance: 
obeying imperfect institutional requirements. This 
could include imposing more control in contracts 
and structural arrangements, for example, as a 
response to problems of a lack of trust. To elaborate 
and demonstrate our definition within the context 
of construction, the following propositions have 
been formulated (Figure 3). 
 
Proposition 1: The higher the degree of social 
legitimacy, stability, and/or survival capability 
conceived by social actors, to be attainable from 
acquiescence to imperfect institutional pressure, 
the greater the likelihood of waste to be 
institutionalised within construction.  
 
An example of this could be the adherence of the 
construction industry to use short time-frame and 
price-competitive tendering processes, as a widely 
shared and taken for granted practice, despite it 
Figure 3: Conceptual model of construction procurement as institutional arrangements 
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being associated with many flawed risk 
assumptions and criticised cost estimations 
(Laryea, 2011). Adding to this, is the use of 
extensive, time consuming and unnecessarily 
expensive prequalification procedures (Hughes et 
al., 2001) in public projects,  e.g. questionnaires 
(PQQ), that may lead to wasteful activities such as 
cover-pricing. In particular, the use of PQQs for 
procuring projects below the European Union 
threshold (approximately £100,000) restrains many 
SMEs from applying for public contracts (i.e. 
waste of human potential) and substantially 
increases tendering costs and time (HM 
Government, 2013). This also includes the textual 
complexity and unnecessary formality in contract 
wordings of some contract conditions (i.e. FIDIC, 
1999 and NEC, 1993) that are very difficult to read, 
and require at least college-level reading skills to 
correctly interpret them (Rameezdeen and 
Rajapakse, 2007; Rameezdeen and Rodrigo, 2013). 
It is important to emphasise here that lawyers and 
specialist surveyors are not the primary users of a 
contract; it is the project parties’ ability to capture 
their meaning which is fundamental for contract 
performance (Rameezdeen and Rodrigo, 2013). 
 
Proposition 2: The higher the degree of financial 
benefit, protection and guarantee, and/or vested 
interest rationalised by social actors, to be 
attainable from conformance to imperfect 
institutional processes, the greater the likelihood of 
waste to be institutionalised within construction.  
 
Examples of this include the heavily reliance of 
construction parties on the deep-rooted practice of 
using standard forms of contracts (Eriksson and 
Laan, 2007).  These safeguards bring with it lots of 
formality and rigidity that stifles cooperation and 
focuses on the individual parties and their 
responsibilities; thereby driving a distance between 
project parties and encouraging opportunistic 
behaviour (Cox and Thompson, 1997; Eriksson et 
al. 2008). Other examples include the traditional 
use of disclaimer (exculpatory) clauses in 
construction contracts (Zaghloul and Hartman, 
2003). This unfair risk allocation approach leads to 
increased costs of projects in the form of 
unnecessary contingencies and insurances (i.e. cost 
wastage), restricted bid-competitions (i.e. waste of 
human potential), and potential disputes (i.e. time 
waste). Similar imperfect procurement 
arrangements include the use of high rates of cash 
retentions on short contracts (Hughes et al., 2000); 
and requirements for performance bonds that are 
often disproportionate and may restrict SMEs 
aiming to bid for public contracts (HM 
Government, 2013). More obvious examples 
include architects' and quantity surveyors' biased 
preferences for the use of traditional lump-sum 
procurement systems with provisional quantities 
(Love et al., 1998). 
 
Proposition 3: The higher the degree of 
dependency of social actors on imperfect 
institutional processes, the greater the likelihood of 
waste to be institutionalised within construction.  
 
An example of this could be organisations which 
depend on obtaining their funding through bank 
loans, and as a result may pay more attention to 
their funders’ requirements rather than their 
customers’ needs (Chiang and Cheng, 2010). 
Another example is clients' over-reliance on 
conventional insurance arrangements which add 
unnecessary costs to constructions projects and can 
also obstruct collaboration between supply chains 
(Ndekugri et al., 2013). This could also be 
associated with the way that clients’ advisors often 
set the ‘rules of the game’ (i.e. procurement type 
and construction periods stated in tenders) and then 
everyone else has to work within these rules, which 
could sometimes be dysfunctional. This  dilemma 
is often a result of discrepancies in power that exist 
among major players in the industry and within 
project coalitions (Winch, 2000a). 
 
Proposition 4: The higher the degree of 
consistency of organisational goals and purposes 
with imperfect institutional pressures and norms, 
the greater the likelihood of waste to be 
institutionalised within construction.  
 
For instance, it’s not unusual for construction 
organisations, because of competitive pressure, to 
rely on making their profits solely through 
commercial processes and manipulating roles with 
others, rather than struggling to improve 
production efficiency (Zimina and Pasquire, 
2011b). As an interviewee in a study by Chiang and 
Cheng (2010) commented, contractors could only 
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make profits, in this highly price-competitive 
industry, if they concentrated their efforts on three 
issues: (1) procurement of building materials; (2) 
cash flow management with their downstream 
supply chain; (3) planning for and application of 
claims. Thus, this suggests that it important, for 
further studies, to identify clients' and construction 
organisations' characteristics, strategies and tactics, 
that make them more or less obedient to imperfect 
institutional processes.. 
 
Proposition 5: The higher the degree of voluntary 
diffusion of imperfect institutional rules, routines 
or norms, the greater the likelihood of waste to be 
institutionalised within construction.  
 
This is mainly associated with mimetic institutional 
waste. An example could be the imperfect norms, 
job duties and responsibilities diffused by 
professional institutions and trade associations, 
with which its members are requested to conform.  
In such cases of very widely taken-for-granted 
understandings of what constitute genuine 
practices, it is highly likely that practitioners will 
conform because it does not occur to them to do 
otherwise (Oliver, 1991). Labour/trade unions are 
also powerful actors that influence the culture in 
the construction industry. They were identified in 
an empirical study by Eriksson et al. (2008) as 
industry barriers to change in general, and 
increased cooperation in specific, due to their 
conservative and defensive culture that encourages 
upholding of the status quo. An example of 
imperfect institutional pressure diffused by trade 
unions, as identified by Eriksson et al. (2008), was 
their requirement for fixed piece rates, regardless 
of time, for blue-collar workers, which in turn 
undermined collaboration between different crafts. 
Another example would include decision maker’s 
simply trying what others have found to work, for 
example traditional procurement, or critical path 
planning – push system technique (Koskela et al., 
2014). 
 
Proposition 6: The higher the degree of 
environmental uncertainty, the greater the 
likelihood of waste to be institutionalised within 
construction.  
 
Environmental uncertainty in the construction 
industry can include, for e.g., fluctuations in the 
state of the economy comprised of factors such as 
inflation, changes to government macroeconomic 
policies and periods of instability of funding. 
Under such conditions, it is more likely for 
organisations to adhere to imperfect institutional 
regulations, norms & requirements imposed on 
them by governmental management, funders, 
professional association and public media pressure 
for the sake of survival, legitimacy, and protection 
from environmental turbulence (Oliver, 1991). 
Concluding Discussion 
The construction industry is often regarded as 
confrontational, risks averse, and lacking trust and 
capacity for innovation and improvement 
(Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003; Rooke et al., 2004; 
Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Eriksson et al., 2008). It 
has been extensively criticised, in particular, for its 
short term “hit-and-run” relationships which are 
focused on win-lose situations. Generally, 
increased collaboration between project parties, to 
support production flow, has been argued to be a 
suitable remedy for many of the industry’s 
problems (Eriksson et al., 2008; Sarhan et al., 
2017). Since, the extent of cooperation (and trust) 
is largely influenced by procurement arrangements 
and procedures (Sarhan et al., 2017, Eriksson and 
Laan, 2007); this is considered a key area that 
requires substantial attention and improvement 
(Egan, 1998) and which is central to overall client 
satisfaction and project success (Love et al., 1998; 
Tookey et al., 2001; Osipova and Eriksson, 2011). 
A small but emerging number of studies have 
attempted to investigate the relationship between 
procurement systems and waste in construction 
(e.g. Gamage et al., 2009). However, most of these 
studies, if not all, have limited their attention to 
material waste as opposed to process waste and 
value creation. Additionally, very few, if any 
waste-related studies, have sought to explore the 
influence of performance shaping mechanisms (i.e. 
institutional context in which human actions take 
place and decisions are made) within the 
construction procurement context. 
Hence, Construction business systems are regarded 
as institutions (Winch, 2000a&b; Sha, 2004) that 
The Engineering Project Organization Journal (January 2018) Volume 8  
 
 
The Engineering Project Organization Journal 
©2017 Engineering Project Organization Society 
www.epossociety.org 
are created in countries to specify ‘the rules of the 
game’, and regulate the relations and interactions 
between the different parties involved in the 
industry. As a corollary, this study conceptualises 
procurement systems as institutional arrangements 
that are designed to assign liabilities and authorities 
to people and organizations at the programme and 
project levels; and thus structure the boarders that 
shape the play of the game. According to economic 
institutionalists, there are at least three types of 
influences that institutions, whether formal (e.g. 
rules and regulations) or informal (e.g. norms), 
have on behaviour (Dequesh, 2002, Phua, 2006): 
 
 Constraints on behaviour in the form of 
rules and regulations and set of procedures 
to detect deviations from the rules and 
regulations, and set of moral and ethical 
norms that define the boarders that confine 
the way in which the rules and regulations 
are specified and enforcement is carried 
out  (i.e. restrictive function);  
 Influence on perception or reception of 
reality (ie. informational-cognitive 
function);  
 Influence on end goals that people pursue 
(i.e motivational or teleological function). 
 
From an economic perspective, it is easy to 
understand why economic actors are more likely to 
conform to institutional forces, as this will be based 
on obvious cost and efficiency-based 
considerations; and also due to the prevailing 
'norms that provide "legitimacy" to a set of rules' 
(North, 1994, p. 366). However, the social 
perspective argues that the compliance with 
institutional processes is not necessarily based on 
efficiency considerations. Instead, conformance is 
principally based on social legitimacy drivers 
(Scott, 2012). The compliance with norms, beliefs 
and regulations is regarded important, because it 
allows those who comply with them to gain 
increased legitimacy, survival capability, social 
support, stability, access to resources, acceptance 
in professions, and expedience to avoid 
questioning (Oliver, 1991, Scott, 2005).  
Despite the distinctive differences underpinning 
each of these two perspectives, an overarching 
assumption common to both is that people and 
organisations are seen as rational, purposive and 
empowered, albeit bounded, actors whose 
behaviours and decisions are constrained by the 
influence of the institutional pressure imposed on 
them (Phua, 2006). Scott (2012) has argued that the 
concepts employed in contingency and resource-
based studies are relatively limited when compared 
to neo-institutional theory of social and 
organisational studies, as they direct main attention 
to governments and regulatory systems; thereby 
neglecting the equally important roles played by 
normative and cultural–cognitive systems. 
Similarly, the authors of this study believe that 
institutional concepts used in economic-based 
studies (e.g. Williamson, 2000), overlook, or at 
least give less attention to, normative and cultural–
cognitive systems, that are vital forces affecting the 
success of construction projects (Scott, 2012). 
Hence, the construction industry is very labour-
intensive/oriented, it seems to us therefore that neo-
institutional theory is more suitable and powerful 
for construction management studies in general, 
and this study in specific. 
The fact that much of the waste produced in 
construction is common to many projects led to the 
study's hypothesis that there are imperfect 
institutional regulations, norms, and cultural -
cognitive framework assumptions within the 
construction procurement context, which support 
and/or encourage wasteful activities. Examples of 
these include: traditional lump-sum procurement 
systems based on price-competitive tendering 
(Winch, 2000b; Love et al., 2011b; Laryea and 
Hughes, 2008; Mohammed et al., 2011); silo 
thinking and resistance to change such that existing 
values and beliefs are not open for questioning 
(Winch, 2000a; Eriksson et al., 2008); traditional 
insurance products (Kent and Becerik Gerber, 
2010; Ndekugri et al., 2013); textual complexity of 
standard contracts (Rameezdeen and Rajapakse, 
2007; Rameezdeen and Rodrigo, 2013), disclaimer 
clauses (Zaghloul & Hartman, 2003; Love et al., 
2010); late payments (Poverbs, 2000; Hughes, 
2000),); the short-term focus as exemplified by 
clients’ habit of changing suppliers between 
projects through the frequent use of open bid 
invitation procedures (Erikkson et al, 2008).  
Many of these imperfect procurement 
arrangements and assumptions are common in 
construction projects, leading to frequent 
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unsatisfactory outcomes. It is thus questionable 
why conventional procurement systems remain 
very prevalent, as opposed to newer and more 
collaborative forms of procurement that are 
deemed to be more beneficial and efficient. This is 
a valid fundamental question hence there are 
substantial trends towards establishing cooperative 
ways of working as a means for improving project 
performance and outcomes. Previous research has 
provided different explanations which helped to 
partially explain the reason for this contradiction 
between clients' desires and actions. These 
included the fact that the construction industry 
operates in a very competitively cost-driven 
environment (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000). In a 
study by Eriksson et al. (2008), it was suggested 
that clients lack the incentives for the use of 
partnering due to inadequate awareness and 
understanding of how their procurement 
procedures influence their likelihoods of creating a 
cooperative environment. Other reasons suggested 
by them included lack of top management 
commitment and resistance to change. Similarly, 
Brensen and Haslam (1991) linked this to the 
"habituation" phenomenon that occurs as 
experienced clients establish a 'close-minded' 
approach to building, thereby merely utilizing 
those procurement procedures that are most 
familiar to them (Love et al., 1998). Phua (2006) 
attributed this to the lack of dominating industry 
norms that advocate the use of partnering (e.g. 
government policies and guidelines, technologies, 
beliefs and expectations).  
Additionally, it could be argued that many clients 
conform to imperfect conventional procurement 
procedures, due to institutional pressure imposed 
on them (Sarhan et al., 2017). Most of the clients, 
who procure construction projects, lack experience 
and may only ever build once or twice (Love et al., 
2010). Thus, they invariably rely on taking 
professional advice from consultants, financiers, 
and legal advisers. These actors who are relatively 
powered than other (winch, 2000a), may have a 
vested interest (i.e. social and/or economic 
motivations) for the wide-spread use of some 
imperfect procurement arrangements; thereby 
dictating the rules of the game - the way we do 
business (Sarhan et al., 2017). When imperfect 
procurement (institutional) arrangements prevail 
they restrict and govern the way that project 
partners behave and interact, leading to common 
and repeated unsatisfactory outcomes (see Figure 
3).  
Due to the one-off nature of many construction 
projects and the short-term focus characterising 
many construction clients and decision-makers, 
there are less opportunities for learning from 
project outcomes. Let alone, that the construction 
industry, as an organisational field (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983), is particularly characterized by its 
high levels of complexity and industry specific 
uncertainties and interdependences (Dubois and 
Gadde, 2002). Accordingly, this study argues that 
imperfect institutional forces that surround the 
construction procurement environment lead 
to more legitimacy and/or use of risk-averse 
safeguarding approaches in procurement (Sarhan et 
al., 2017), which deter attention away from core-
efficiency purposes; thereby restricting value 
creation and possibly decreasing revenues for all 
project parties. When the same or similar 
(imperfect) institutional pressures continue over 
time, isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) 
will lead to (inefficient) construction procurement 
arrangements becoming more homogeneous, and 
as a result, standardised patterns of behaviour and 
common project outcomes are most likely to occur. 
These arguments are supported by Winch (2000a) 
who stressed, albeit through a relatively limited 
economic insight that: 
 
"Just as patterns of behaviour become 
institutionalized so that they act back upon 
the actors through the process of 
structuration (Giddens, 1984), the rules of 
the game come to be seen as given, normal, 
the only way to do things. Careers and status 
become dependent upon certain rules; 
threats to those rules become personal 
attacks". (p. 90) 
Work by Sarhan et al. (2016) discussed the factors 
influencing the ‘Principal-Agent’ relationship in 
construction, demonstrating that institutional 
forces (i.e. vested interests and bargaining strength 
of major industry players) can have an influence on 
shaping procurement practices. Their study used 
the UK’s Highways Agency transformation into 
Highways England, as a practical example of how 
construction models and procurement practices 
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often mirror institutional factors. According to 
them, this transformation and change in the status 
of the principal has led to change in rules and 
procurement practices in the UK highways sector. 
This included, for example, a movement from the 
deployment of large integrated ‘manage and 
maintain’ contracts towards fragmenting contracts 
in order to secure greater control and visibility of 
costs.  
A subsequent study by Sarhan et al. (2017) 
identified and critically evaluated a number of 
imperfect taken for granted safeguarding 
techniques (Table 4) in construction procurement, 
which stifle cooperation and entrench wasteful 
processes across the supply chain and throughout 
the project. According to them, these imperfect 
procurement arrangements dominate the 
management of the project delivery often to the 
detriment of the project itself; but because there is 
a belief that interests are safeguarded, clients and 
decision makers feel they have taken the best 
course of action. Thus, these imperfect 
safeguarding practices, based on mal-applied 
transactional considerations, was described by 
them as a source of institutionalised waste in 
construction. They argued that ‘self-interest’ (as a 
cultural/cognitive institutional factor) drives 
opportunism and influences governance 
approaches, leading to a dichotomy as one 
organisation seeks to protects its interests from the 
opportunism of others whist continuing to exploit 
all opportunities. Interestingly, their study urged us 
to focus our attention towards institutional factors 
influencing the choice of imperfect procurement 
arrangements, as they are the ‘root causes’ for 
many of the wastes we encounter at the supply-
chain level. 
This study builds on the work of Sarhan et al. (2016 
and 2017) to provide explanations as to how that an 
imperfect institutional environment can lead to 
inferior construction procurement arrangements, 
which may cause transaction and production losses 
(i.e. waste). In general, increased trustful 
collaboration between project parties, to support 
and enhance production flow, is argued to be an 
appropriate remedy for many of the industry’s 
problems (see e.g. Eriksson et al., 2008; Xue et al., 
2010; Sebastian, 2011; Walker et al., 2017). The 
adoption of collaborative procurement approaches 
can help to align interests and eliminate much of 
the waste embedded in construction processes; 
however, arguably, the prevailing imperfect 
institutional factors and mind-sets are pinning the 
wasteful system in place. The conceptual model 
(Figure 3) and guiding propositions provided in 
this study could act as a primary step for unpicking 
the coherence and yet wastefulness of the current 
construction business models. This approach 
resonates with Matos-Castano’s (2014) assertion 
that providing an enabling environment for newer 
and more collaborative construction business and 
procurement models entails a combination of 
changing existing institutions relating to project 
procurement and creating supporting institutions 
that build trustful collaboration between and 
among stakeholders, as opposed to merely creating 
institutions to provide legitimacy to public sector 
decision makers. 
Table 4. A categorisation of various safeguarding approaches in construction procurement (Sarhan et 
al., 2017) 
 
Prevalent  safeguarding approaches based on 'risk 
allocation' considerations 
Less prevalent safeguarding approaches based 
on 'process flow' considerations 
Standard forms of contract Relational contracting 
Use of Disclaimer/Exculpatory clauses Shared risks and rewards 
Traditional insurance arrangements/products Single project insurance  
Collateral warranties Latent defects insurance 
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Conclusions and Further 
Research 
The prevailing understanding of waste, arguably, 
encourages the improvement of current processes 
rather than fundamental system redesign. 
Obtaining a better understanding and 
conceptualisation of waste in construction is 
therefore becoming more crucial to prepare the 
industry for the radical change demanded. 
Certainly, one aspect of this conceptualisation is 
the consideration of the wider institutional, 
organisational, and commercial environments that 
surround the design and delivery of construction 
projects. Institutions influence beliefs, norms and 
actions; thus they shape performance and 
outcomes. However, this study found that the 
concept of institutions is not well established in 
construction management and economics research, 
specifically in waste-related literature. An overall 
analysis of the concept of waste in construction, 
revealed that very few, if any, studies have sought 
to consider the influence of the commercial and 
institutional context on pinning the prevailing 
wasteful system in place. 
This study has offered a novel perspective to the 
generation and persistence of waste in construction 
projects by introducing the concept of 'Institutional 
Waste' within the construction procurement 
context. The study has also exemplified various 
taken-for-granted rules, norms and meanings that 
impede efficiency and improvement efforts in 
construction. Based on a thorough review of 
construction-procurement literature, using neo-
institutional theory as an analytical lens, the study 
stressed that construction procurement 
arrangements and practices are shaped by 
institutional structures, beliefs and attitudes as well 
as project characteristics. The study also 
demonstrated how that an imperfect institutional 
environment influences construction procurement 
arrangements, thereby contributing to the 
generation of institutionalised wastes in 
construction projects. Having provided a 
conceptual framework, the six propositions 
developed, within this study, lend themselves to 
empirical testing. The underlying premise of this 
study is that if we can understand the detailed 
‘institutional causes’ of coherence for the 
prevailing construction business models and reveal 
the consequential waste, then the adoption of more 
efficient and collaborative business and project 
delivery models may become more widespread. 
The scope of this study is limited to commercial 
buildings, industrial construction and infrastructure 
projects in the UK. However, with an exception to 
the varying regulative context within different 
countries, it could be argued that the construction 
culture and norms of practice are relatively 
universal (Rooke et al., 2003). Thus, the concept of 
‘institutional waste’ has the potential to be 
generalised across the whole construction industry 
worldwide. Future studies are encouraged to assess 
the concept’s compatibility, relevance and 
significance to other sectors and industries. 
The findings presented in this study provide a 
theoretical anchor and rationale for future re-
shaping of the roles and responsibilities of the 
professions and wider participants involved within 
the construction sector, in order to increase the 
production effectiveness of the industry. Future 
studies are also recommended to gain a better 
understanding of the clients' and major players' 
characteristics, strategies and tactics, that make 
them more or less obedient to imperfect 
institutional and commercial pressure. In that way, 
this can help clients and decision makers to be 
aware of the institutional factors affecting the 
choice of their procurement procedures, and thus 
their desired project outcomes. Also, it could 
enable them to consider the adoption of newer 
contractual and project-organisational techniques 
that could be of more value to them.  
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 Appendix 1: A snapshot of Table of information developed for literature review purposes 
 
Study Research Method Main aim(s) of the study Imperfections within the construction procurement context 
Tookey et al. 
(2001) 
A questionnaire based 
on Masterman’s (1994) 
procurement 
contentions for 
assessment of 
procurement choice. 
The study targeted a 
sample of 12 projects 
giving permission for 
the research team to 
gather data. An 
approach of elite 
interviewing was used 
targeting critical 
decision makers on the 
projects  
To identify whether clients 
follow prescriptive 
procurement guidelines 
provided by academics for 
selection of  appropriate 
procurement system 
 Clients’ over-reliance on professional advice given to them 
by consultants, which may be biased, misleading or based 
on vested interest; 
 The existing approach to procurement selection which is 
based on tender cost and (imperfect) contract type dictating 
organisational structure. For example, ‘Too many clients 
[use] Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT) contracts even if 
[inappropriate]’ (Contracts Journal, 2000) – This selection 
of use is often based on imitation rather than efficiency 
reasons. As a consequence of this choice, the (imperfect) 
contract type dictates the project-organisational structure 
which governs the way functions interact during product 
development. 
Wordley 
(1991) 
Literature review/ 
opinion based 
To examine the respective 
concepts of both collateral 
warranties and Latent defects 
insurance with a view to 
highlighting the strengths and 
weaknesses of each 
arrangement. 
 Collateral warranties – vagaries of litigation together with 
its transactional cost, delay and substantial demands on 
management time; uncertainty about the performance of 
the asset backing the warranty; increases the overall cost of 
the insurance on any one project; hinders collaboration and 
encourages disputes 
Eriksson et 
al. (2008) 
A survey study of 87 
professional 
construction clients in 
Sweden. 
To identify critical barriers to 
partnering, as perceived by 
construction clients, and the 
specific measures that are 
taken to overcome them 
during implementation. 
 Cultural barriers to partnering/cooperation as identified 
from literature: 
o Short term focus – is accentuated by the clients’ habit 
of changing suppliers between projects through the 
frequent use of open bid invitation procedures 
o Adversarial attitudes - Win-lose situations 
o Conservative industry culture - existing values and 
beliefs are not open for questioning 
o Lack of sub-supplier involvement in specification 
 
 Organisational barriers to partnering/ cooperation: 
o Focus on project outcomes instead of processes 
o Traditional organisation of the construction process 
(e.g. sequential processes) 
o Traditional procurement procedures – e.g. The focus 
on lowest price in bid evaluation 
o New competence requirements 
 
 Industrial barriers to partnering/cooperation: 
o Trade/Labour Unions - have a conservative and 
defensive culture that inhibits change and encourages 
maintenance of the status quo (Craft, 1991). An 
example from the Swedish construction industry is 
their requirement for piecework rates (fixed piece 
rate for each unit produced or action performed 
regardless of time) for blue-collar workers that do not 
encourage collaboration between different crafts 
o Deep-rooted practice of using standard contracts 
established by third parties - bring a formality that 
stifles good relationships, and focus on the individual 
parties and their responsibilities, thereby driving a 
distance between them 
o Laws and regulations (no specific examples were 
provided within the study) 
 
Note: by using Principal component factor analysis (PCFA), 
labour unions loaded more on the cultural barrier factor than on 
the expected industrial barrier factor. 
 
 
